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The Decline of Democracy 
in Venezuela:
The Deterioration of Venezuelan Exceptionalism  
and the Rise of Hugo Chávez
by Meredith Aach
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any view Venezuela as a country with 
a nationalist authoritarian leader 
where democratic governance has 
steadily been on the decline.  In 
2007, a United States-based organi-
zation that focuses on advocacy 
for and research on democratic 
rule, political freedom, and hu-
man rights around the world, 
ranked Venezuela as a 4 on a scale 
from 1 to 7, 1 being the most free 
and 7 being the least free.  This 
number has risen from 1.5 in 
1986 and 2.5 in 1998 (Freedom 
House, 2007).   There has been a 
suppression of opposition from 
workers of Petróleos de Venezu-
ela Sociedad Anómia (PDVSA), 
the state oil company, and the 
closing down of RCTV, one of the 
country’s oldest television stations 
and critic of Hugo Chávez’s re-
gime.  President Chavez’s political 
agenda, reforms, and his moves to 
strengthen the presidency have 
led some to wonder for how long 
democracy will last in Venezuela.  
The proposition that Venezuela is 
a model democracy has seemed 
to have completely disappeared.  
What has led to the decline in 
democratic governance in Venezu-
ela?  
The impact of oil is one rea-
son cited for Venezuela’s move to 
the left and its move away from 
democracy.  Many contend that oil 
serves as an impediment to de-
velopment for political, economic, 
and cultural reasons.  Politically, 
oil encourages rent-seeking be-
havior, corruption, and depending 
on the timing of oil production; 
it can prevent strong institutions 
M
and an environment of democratic 
governance from developing and 
continuing.  Economically, the 
Dutch disease, the phenomenon 
where an inflow of money from 
natural resource wealth leads 
to currency appreciation, hurts 
domestic industry, economies 
tend to be less diversified, and 
countries often depend on the 
volatile oil industry for public 
spending and development.  This 
allows vulnerabilities to exist 
which can intensify in times of 
crisis, increasing public dissatis-
faction.  Culturally, dependence 
on oil prevents a relationship of 
accountability from developing 
between the government and its 
people because of the lack of a 
taxation system.  It also fosters a 
culture of consumerism ignoring 
the systemic and structural issues 
that hinder equitable growth and 
development (Hellinger, 1994; 
Karl, 1997; Ross, 2001; Schubert, 
2006).  
Many theorists attribute the 
decline in democratic governance 
and in protecting civilians’ free-
doms to the “oil curse” (Friedman, 
2006; Ross, 2001).  However, the 
history of oil is unique to each 
country and needs to be explored 
in the context of other political, 
economic, and social conditions.  
First, one must understand the 
process of state building concur-
rent with the finding and excava-
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tion of oil.  Second, the way in which oil has affected 
political institutions, especially the political parties, 
can provide significant insight.  Third, one must also 
evaluate how oil development and changes in gover-
nance have impacted local public opinion, which has 
reflected strong support for the internationally criti-
cized Chávez regime.  
Overturning Venezuelan Exceptionalism
 In Venezuela, state-building began around 
1920s which was about the same time oil was dis-
covered in the country.  As Miguel Salas states, “oil 
remained inseparable from the evolution of Venezu-
elan state building” (2007, p. 35).  The presidency 
maintained almost unlimited power because of a lack 
of checks and balances established in the process of 
state development.  Furthermore, factionalism, “part-
yarchy” and the formation of a pacted democracy al-
lowed for the illusion that Venezuela had established a 
stable and honest democracy with representative rule 
(Ellner, Salas, et al., 2007; Karl, 1997).  This illusion 
of a legitimate democracy ran parallel to the ideals 
of Western-style democracy and became known as 
“Venezuelan exceptionalism”; the idea that Venezu-
ela avoided the crises plaguing the rest of the hemi-
sphere including tendencies to authoritarian rule, civ-
il strife, and weak political institutions (Ellner, Salas, 
et al., 2007; Levine, 1994).  In the mind of the United 
States government, Venezuela became the exception 
and model that other countries in Latin America, who 
were dealing with racial conflict, military dictator-
ships, and political instability, should follow.  However, 
this illusion broke down in the 1980s under the weight 
of increasing debt, worsening impoverishment, and 
greater disillusionment with traditional “democratic” 
institutions.  
Venezuelan exceptionalism, according to Ellner 
and Salas, rested upon three principles.  First, Ven-
ezuela was economically “privileged” when compar-
ing the country to others in Latin America.  Second, it 
remained relatively free from class and racial conflicts 
that often hurt stability elsewhere in the region.  Fi-
nally, the system of democracy and the political sys-
tem were viewed as “healthy and solid” by the United 
States and other Western countries (2007, p. 5).  This 
paper will focus on the third principle by addressing 
why Venezuela was accepted as a “model democracy, 
” why this idea was ultimately rejected, and how this 
has led to declining democratic governance in Ven-
ezuela today.
Venezuela was viewed as having a healthy democ-
racy because of the relative stability maintained since 
the country’s initial democratic regime until the mid-
1970s.  Venezuela’s centralized government, power-
sharing agreements among the elites, and the support 
from oil income, determined this stability (Levine, 
1994; Karl, 1997; Ellner, Salas, et al., 2007).  However, 
this viewpoint was grounded in faulty assumptions 
and allowed for the government to avoid dealing with 
serious problems.  The embedded vulnerabilities of 
the Venezuelan state system became apparent with 
the onset of the financial crises of the 1980s.    The 
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realization that Venezuela was not a model democ-
racy then solidified with the increasing violence in 
the 1990s, and finally, with the two coups of 1992 and 
Hugo Chávez’s rise to power.  In order to understand 
the decline of democratic governance today, one must 
look back to the factors that established the legitima-
cy of Venezuelan exceptionalism, including  the “sta-
bility” maintained by the strong central state authority 
and “partyarchy,” and the effect oil had on Venezuela’s 
political culture, institutions, and on the relationship 
between the state and the public .  
Strong Central Authority
Centralization of Power in the State:
Centralized power in the Venezuelan presidency 
has existed since the entrance of oil companies into 
the country.  This power was facilitated by a weak 
congress, powerful political parties, and the use of oil 
to maintain stability.  The expansion and centraliza-
tion of the state laid the foundation for future presi-
dents of Venezuela to maintain their authority and the 
country’s stability, while preventing a strong, healthy 
democracy from emerging.  
The role of the state in Venezuela fundamentally 
changed during the regime of Lieutenant Juan Vicente 
Gómez during the early 1920s.  Until the mid-twenti-
eth century, caudillismo, in which powerful landown-
ers and elites were the major nodes of political au-
thority, characterized Venezuelan leaders.  There was 
a lack of political, social or administrative institutions; 
thus, political rules were established by force with 
self-organized militias and leaders as the only legiti-
mate rulers.  However, there was a persistent need for 
a strong central authority, which the caudillos, them-
selves, wanted to embody (Hellinger et. al, 1994). 
The centralization of power in the state initially 
began with the entrance of oil companies into Venezu-
ela in the early 1900s.  Oil was first discovered at Lake 
Maracaibo in 1922, and then subsidiaries of Standard, 
Shell, and Gulf entered the country (Hellinger, 1994).  
The scramble for petroleum during this time allowed 
Gómez to consolidate power in the presidency.  He 
saw the benefits of linking himself with foreign capital 
and taking advantage of the competition between oil 
companies.  He led negotiations on concessions with-
out the restraint and check of Congress, actions which 
served to benefit both the oil companies, who could 
obtain crude oil supplies, and Gómez, who centralized 
his power and increased his personal wealth (Hell-
inger, 2000; Karl, 1997).  
Second, Gómez’s petroleum laws further allowed 
him to empower the executive branch.  For instance, 
he declared private land rights unconstitutional in 
1922 because the oil companies wanted to deal with 
one, weak, central authority rather than numerous, 
decentralized land elites (Karl, 1997).  The move from 
caudillismo, mostly decentralized, to presidentialism 
led to the expansion of state central authority.  This 
would allow predation, patronage, and the notion that 
oil and petrodollars could be used to maintain stabil-
ity in a regime (Karl, 1997).  This idea would remain 
dominant for the next century.
The centralization and expansion of state author-
ity included the expanded jurisdiction of the state.  
The public wanted the government to capture more 
rents from the “imperialist” oil companies that could 
be used for social programs.  In the mid to late 1940s, 
President Betancourt promised that the newly formed 
Acción Democrática (AD), a dominant political party 
in Venezuela, would demand a fairer, or more “just” 
share of oil earnings to improve the standard of living 
and the conditions in Venezuela (Hellinger, 1994).  The 
Hydrocarbons Act of 1943 incorporated new taxes on 
oil companies, which would later lead to a “50-50” 
share in profits further increasing the complexity of 
the state(Karl, 1997).  
The country’s economy was burdened with an influx 
of dollars, and the Venezuelan currency became over-
valued, encouraging imports and ultimately stunting 
growth of the domestic industries—the embodiment 
of the “Dutch Disease.”  The agricultural industry was 
hurt and made uncompetitive with the complete col-
lapse of coffee and cacao exports (Karl, 1997).  These 
conditions led to the financial crises of the 1940s 
because of the country’s massive deficits.  Revenue 
could not be obtained through taxation of the people 
due to the damaged agricultural sector and because 
the urban class was already devastated by the crises.  
Instead, the state had to rely on the oil companies for 
income.  The Hydrocarbons Act also led to rentier 
behavior because of the domestic cooperation orga-




The nature of the petro-state 
requires a strong government 
because “both the requirements 
of oil exploitation and the deplet-
ability of the resource necessitate 
a highly centralized authority” 
(Karl, 1999, p. 35).  Beyond the 
1940s, the centrality of state au-
thority persisted.  The state had 
more responsibilities, but it was 
still weak and lacked the capacity 
to take on this role.  Furthermore, 
strain on Venezuelan institutions 
and public dissatisfaction during 
the seventies and eighties pro-
pelled desire for more jurisdiction 
of the state; yet, the state was un-
able to handle the new responsi-
bilities it was handed.  Corruption 
and administrative inefficiencies 
pervaded government institu-
tions (Karl, 1997).  The history of 
Venezuelan state building and the 
necessities of the oil state contin-
ued the expansion and increased 
complexity of the central author-
ity.  As Karl explains, there was a 
large gap between “jurisdiction” 
and “authority”, or rather between 
the “scope or degree of interven-
tion in the economy…and…its 
ability to penetrate society and 
channel effectively the direction 
of change” (1997, p. 14).  This gap 
would lead to the crises of the 
1980s.
In 1973, the Arab oil embargo 
sent oil prices skyrocketing, 
quadrupling them overnight, and 
making the push for nationaliza-
tion strong.  In 1976, Venezuela 
nationalized its oil industry, and 
finally, the oil “belonged” to Vene-
zuela.  Or did it only belong to the 
elites?  At the time the president, 
Carlos Andrés Pérez, increased 
spending which began to spiral 
out of control and outstripped 
revenue (Hellinger, 1994).  Pérez 
then looked to United States’ 
banks to borrow, putting Venezu-
ela in debt, allowing spending to 
further grow uncontrollably, and 
damaging fiscal discipline for the 
long term.  This also prevented 
efforts at instituting a tax reform 
because it was almost impossible 
to persuade Venezuelans that the 
state needed more money (Karl, 
1997).  The public felt the state 
was already rich and that it did 
not need to take more money from 
them.  The lack of a tax structure 
also prevented a healthy relation-
ship from developing between 
the state and the public, known 
to some as the “taxation effect,” 
which further increases corrup-
tion (Ross, 2001).  
The revenue received from the 
petroleum industry allowed for 
the continuity of the myth that the 
state could effectively handle a 
larger role in the economy.  From 
1917 until 1936, it is estimated 
that 29% of state revenues came 
from oil.  In 1936 until 1945, that 
percentage jumped to 54% of 
state revenue.  And, between 1945 
until 1958, the percentage of oil 
revenue that was a part of state 
revenue was 71% (Salas, 2007).  
The myth centered on the large 
amount of money the state col-
lected from the rise in oil prices 
and oil revenues, which meant it 
could effectively manage crises, 
and meet the public’s needs and 
desires.  This type of oil-based 
development caused a dangerous 
reliance on the state.  “When oil 
monies first come on stream, or 
when booms occur, rapid petro-
dollar flows encourage new belief 
systems about the expansive role 
of the public sector, new modes 
of behavior and new vested in-
terests” (Karl, 1999, p. 35).  The 
large role of the state is not only 
a belief, but it is also perpetuated 
because of key interests in the oil 
rents.
Venezuelans seemed content 
with how the country was being 
run until the onset of the financial 
crises, which exposed fundamen-
tal vulnerabilities of the current 
political and economic system.  
The dependence on oil revenues 
would prevent the necessary re-
forms that might have enabled the 
state to more effectively deal with 
the current and future structural 
problems of the country.  These 
problems included the decline 
in the price of oil, the inabil-
ity to increase productivity and 
competitiveness, the inability to 
generate other forms of revenue, 
and the deepening “petrolization” 
(Romero, 1997).    
Even attempts to reform led 
to more corruption, cronyism, 
patronage, centralization, and 
bureaucratic inefficiencies (Karl, 
1997).  Reforms were ineffective 
and increased public discontent 
with current conditions.  In one 
instance, former President Car-
los Andrés Pérez implemented 
reforms that were “diametrically 
opposed to his policies of 1974 to 
1978.”  Those past policies gave 
him the support to win the presi-
dency for a second time.  In con-
trast to the late 1970s, he priva-
tized different corporations, cut 
state employment and subsidies, 
and agreed to an International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) program.  
His proposed IMF program pro-






inger, 1994, p. 41). 
The reforms, dur-
ing both the late 
1970s and 1980s, 
led to rent-seek-
ing and the in-
ability to reduce 
corruption, per-
manently hurting 
the authority of 
the pacted democracy.  Karl cor-
rectly points out that these failures 
of the reforms “undermined the 
legitimacy of pacted democracy 
and its capacity to set any coher-
ent economic policy” (Karl, 1997, 
p. 140).  
The history of state building 
and the entrance of oil into Ven-
ezuela led to the development of 
a strong state role in the country’s 
political, economic, and cultural 
spheres.  However, corruption, 
inflexibility, and inefficient man-
agement plagued the state institu-
tions.  These factors led to public 
disillusionment with these institu-
tions, especially directed towards 
the political parties because of 
the “partyarchy” and pacted de-
mocracy that existed in Venezuela. 
The strategy of pact-making and 
alliance building of the pacted 
democracy would be determined 
by oil rents and rent-seeking 
behavior, which would further 
prompt public discontent with po-
litical institutions in Venezuela.   
 Venezuelan Democracy
Pacted Democracy and 
“Partyarchy”
In 1958, pacts were established 
at Punto Fijo between three main 
political parties at the time, Ac-
ción Democrática—Democratic 
Action (AD), Partido Social 
Cristiano de Venezuela—Social 
Christian Party of Venezuela 
(COPEI), and Unión Republicana 
Democrática—Democratic Repub-
lican Union (URD).  These parties 
maintained control over state 
action through power-sharing; 
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however, URD eventually declined in importance with 
AD and COPEI maintaining power for the next three 
decades (Coppedge, 2002; McCoy, 1999).  The power 
and stability maintained by AD and COPEI from the 
1950s until the early 1980s became defined as a 
system of “partyarchy” and pacted democracy under-
written by the massive oil revenues.  Some viewed 
the system as a “subsidized democracy” (Danopoulos 
and Sylvia, 2003).  The economic expansion and social 
mobility experienced during this time legitimized the 
belief that Venezuela was a healthy, stable, and demo-
cratic nation (Karl, 1997; Coppedge, 2002). 
The term “partyarchy” was coined by Coppedge 
(et. al, 2002) to describe the stability achieved by 
giving a central role to the two main political parties 
who would govern through “compromise and shared 
spoils” (Danopoulos and Sylvia, 2003, p. 64).  The Pact 
of Punto Fijo, which established both pacted democ-
racy and the partyarchy, intended to represent the 
lessons the political parties learned from past politi-
cal mistakes especially the failure of the unilateral 
rule during the trienio of 1945-1948 (McCoy, 1999).   
However, the pacts made in 1958 would have their 
own problems; chief among them were their inflexibil-
ity and exclusion. 
Coppedge details AD and COPEI’s maintenance of 
governability and stability between the 1960s to early 
1980s.  First, the parties were seen as being broadly 
representative of society; yet, the party system was 
exclusive only to party representatives.  The “partyar-
chy” created bureaucratic and “hierarchical national 
organizations and relied on oil revenues to satisfy 
the needs of their major constituencies…Oil revenue 
remained inequitable and the parties gradually took 
control of most organizations within civil society” (Mc-
Coy et. al, 1999, p.64-65).  Rather than representing 
all of society, the parties retained the support of the 
elites through oil revenues.  Second, the parties politi-
cized non-party organizations like labor and student 
organizations, which furthered the parties’ outreach to 
civil society (Coppedge et. al, 2002). They maintained 
stability through incentives and constraints for vari-
ous interest groups.  Third, the military was embed-
ded into the political parties, a fact that coerced their 
constituencies into obeying the elites in power and 
fostered an environment of discipline.  Fourth, both 
AD and COPEI continually sought consensus, avoiding 
conflict at all costs (Coppedge, 2002; Romero, 1997).  
Since 1958, the parties “sustained an elite consensus 
and systematically insulated policymaking from sub-
stantive debate” (Karl, 1997, p. 110).  The avoidance of 
conflict through consensus prevented needed reforms 
from being implemented and allowed the state to 
ignore problems that it would eventually have to deal 
with in the future.  Finally, they worked well with other 
actors, especially the military and the public sector 
to compromise and keep each other content with the 
status quo (Coppedge, 2002).  
The power of AD and COPEI is further described 
as a pacted democracy, which Terry Lynn Karl defines 
as “elite bargains and compromises during transi-
tion from authoritarian rule by selectively meeting 
demands” (1997, p. 93).  Not only were pacts made 
between political parties, but also with business and 
church elites.  The groups agreed upon power shar-
ing, reconciliation of grievances, respect for indi-
vidual rights and liberties, reliance on the state as the 
major engine for economic development, postpone-
ment of proposals for redistributing wealth, and the 
support for the United States in the Cold War (Myers, 
2004).  These pacts ensured consensus and enabled 
the state to establish authority, power, and ultimately 
legitimacy through the stability achieved.  
Petro-states, like Venezuela, generally depend upon 
oil revenues and political stability to govern.  Between 
parties and among constituencies there were contests 
for the prize of “a greater share of rents through legal 
and extra-legal practices…These parties evolved into 
organizations competing for their share in the oil-rent 
trough” (Hellinger, 1994, p. 39).  The allocation of rents 
was extremely politicized within the pacted democra-
cy, encouraging rent-seeking behavior and corruption 
among political and business leaders.  The distribu-
tion of oil revenues depended upon satisfying the 
key elite leaders and ensuring that there was at least 
“generalized improvement” in the standard of living 
in Venezuela to maintain stability (Romero, 1997).  This 
balance allowed the system to remain intact, until the 
vulnerabilities inherent in the system finally made this 
strategy of pacted democracy fall.  
As mentioned in the previous section, the structure 
of Venezuelan democracy prevented successful and 
efficient reform of the state to deal with the needs of 
the society.  The powerful political parties, institu-
tional rigidities, and “perverse incentive structure” 
were major obstacles to needed reform (Karl, 1999).  
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First, dependency on distribution hindered regulatory 
processes from developing.  “State officials became 
habituated to relying on the progressive substitu-
tion of public spending for statecraft, thereby further 
weakening state capacity” (Karl, 1997, p. 16).  The lack 
of regulation within Venezuela’s institutions kept the 
state highly centralized, as it was before the pacts of 
1958 (Myers, 2004).  It also allowed Venezuelan insti-
tutions to remain weak, to be plagued by corruption, 
and to have poor public administration (McCoy et al., 
2004).  
Second, Venezuela’s reliance upon distributive poli-
cies to govern prevented any culture of accountability 
from forming between the state and the public (My-
ers, 2004). The immense budget available to the state 
makes irrelevant a tax structure upon which rests gov-
ernment accountability.  As referred to earlier, this is 
what Ross refers to as the “taxation effect,” where the 
state feels less accountable to the public (Ross, 2001).  
The government lacks incentives to address the needs 
and desires of its people.  “Governments that lack ac-
countability…foster a nasty cycle of weakened institu-
tions, patronage, and poor governance, which in turn 
fosters even more corruption.  Once unleashed, these 
forces are difficult, if not impossible, to rein in” (Schu-
bert, 2006, pp. 7-9).  
Third, there were no incentives to be efficient or 
prudent in making policy because money was pour-
ing into the central power structure perpetuating the 
“inflexible system” and encouraging rent seeking 
(Karl, 1999).  The influx of oil revenue produced un-
controllable public spending and unrealistic expecta-
tions of future income, especially on large, wasteful in-
frastructure projects (Schubert, 2006).  The high level 
of rents would facilitate foreign borrowing, rather than 
directly dealing with structural reforms needed.  With 
the loss of fiscal discipline, countries face inflation, 
indebtedness, and develop a culture of corruption 
(Ross, 2001).  Petro-states are not necessarily forced 
to adapt because of their use of oil as collateral and 
because their macroeconomic conditions do not 
necessarily show the problems they are facing (Karl, 
1999).  
In the 1980s, Venezuela faced financial crisis from 
over-spending and from the petroleum industry’s 
inability to produce the rents similar to past experi-
ences.  “The growing gap between the value of oil 
exports and state expenditures meant that petrodol-
lars alone could no longer sustain the government’s 
spending addiction” (Karl, 1997, p. 168).  There was no 
tax structure established, and the opposition to such 
a system was strong, especially from business elites 
who distrusted the state’s ability to implement a tax 
system and believed that petrodollars could be used 
to satisfy their own needs (Karl, 1997).  The increasing 
debt led to the announcement of Pérez’s unpopular 
economic plan agreed upon with the IMF, prompting 
riots and violence.  The public was fed up with “pol-
itics-as-usual” and the inability of the state to handle 
the country’s crisis (Karl, 1997).
Democracy in Venezuela was viewed as healthy and 
stable until the late 1970s and early 1980s.  Gover-
nance did not rely upon institutional strength; instead, 
stability and governability of the state were deter-
mined by the agreements among the elite, distributive 
policies, and factional clientelism.  Venezuela’s pacted 
democracy and “partyarchy,” combined with the in-
flux of oil money, allowed “institutionalization of privi-
lege” for certain groups (Karl, 1997).  As explained 
by Romero, the “influx of oil money has allowed the 
Venezuelan democratic government to postpone the 
‘constellation of problems’ that led to the breakdown 
of democracy in other countries in the region in the 
1960s and 1970s” (1997, p. 9).  The increasing revenue 
from petroleum allowed for the myth that the state was 
able to continue political stability through pact-mak-
ing of different groups, but this served as a detrimen-
tal vulnerability in the future (McCoy, 1999).  
Public Disillusionment
Shown through public opinion polls, many in Ven-
ezuela claimed that a democracy was the most fair 
and just political system that would keep its promises 
to the public.  As Romero points out, the democratic 
pacts and power-sharing agreements were based 
upon the premise that the “democratic state would be 
a more legitimate, stable, and efficient instrument for 
mediating the distribution of oil rents,” in comparison 
to the militaristic dictatorship before 1958 (1997, p. 
8).  Support for democracy is strong in Venezuela, as 
evidenced by opinion polls of the 1990s showing that 
democracy is viewed as the best form of government 
(Romero, 1997), and also those taken today as shown 
by the Latinobarómetro report of 2007 (see page 24).    
While the majority of the population believed in 
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democracy as the best form of 
government, there was strong 
popular discontent with political 
institutions and in their ability to 
deal effectively with the desires 
and problems of the people in the 
1990s.  As referred to by Romero, 
Andrew Templeton’s 
study on public opinion 
provided strong evi-
dence of “long-standing 
popular discontent on 
economic issues, dis-
satisfaction with the 
efficiency of public ad-
ministration, disillusion-
ment with the capacity 
of existing institutions 
to resolve the nation’s 
problems and an in-
creasing conviction that 
these institutions are 
not only inefficient but 
also corrupt” (Romero, 
1997, p. 16).  Romero 
attributes this differ-
ence between feelings 
about democracy and 
the actual conditions 
in Venezuela as a gap 
between “expectations 
and government per-
formance” (et. al, 1997, 
p. 15).    
The public views 
corruption and ma-
levolence as the cause 
for this gap and their 
decreasing standard 
of living.  Furthermore, 
they feel that oil profits 
should be redistributed 
more evenly (Romero, 1995).  The 
declining per capita state oil reve-
nues and growing population from 
the 1960s to late 1990s signified a 
smaller redistribution of Venezu-
ela’s oil wealth.  There was a 47% 
drop from 1963 to 1997 of the per 
capita oil revenue (Wilpert et. al, 
2005).  The inequitable distribu-
tion of oil revenue contributed to 
this notion that the government 
and business elite were corrupt 
and unconcerned with the coun-
try’s poor.  
Although the Venezuelan public 
desires a strong central state and 
a statist model of intervention in 
the economy, the institutions are 
weak.  However, the scapegoat for 
their problem has become cor-
ruption instead of institutional, 
which has been the focus of public 
discontent (Romero, 1997).  Hugo 
Chávez also takes advantage of 
the public’s opinion on corruption 
to gain popularity, support, and 
ultimately control.  In the eyes of 
the public, the paternalistic state 
has an obligation to intervene in 
the economy and to address the 
needs of the people.  This has 
promoted a paradoxical lack of 
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trust in institutions due to corrup-
tion and a simultaneous desire for 
statist intervention. Yet, with such 
a gap between jurisdiction and 
authority, the public has begun to 
trust personalities rather than the 
country’s institutions (Romero et. 
al, 1997).  
Democracy in Crisis: The Emer-
gence of Hugo Chávez
After the two 1992 military 
coups that tried to oust Carlos 
Andrés Pérez, impeached for 
fraud, and after the 1994 collapse 
of the banking system of Rafael 
Caldera, the Punto Fijo agreement 
finally collapsed in 1998 (McCoy, 
1999).  The two administrations 
were viewed as untrustworthy, 
corrupt, and incapable of running 
the country effectively.  They were 
overspending, the country was 
in debt, and the population was 
faced with impoverishment and 
a decreasing standard of living.  
“Not only did these rulers believe 
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they could finance their major 
development projects at home, 
but they could also invest or buy 
resources and protection abroad” 
(Karl, 1999, p. 34).  The lack of 
fiscal discipline led to increasing 
debt and forced the administra-
tions of Pérez and Caldera to 
adopt economic plans including 
austerity measures.  The programs 
seemed harsh for the poor and the 
antithesis of Venezuelans’ opin-
ions on how the state should be 
run.  Both Pérez’s and Caldera’s 
programs were incompatible with 
the public’s desire for the state to 
take care of its people.  
The plans adopted by the 
government were based on the 
neoliberal model that the public 
rejected.  They felt putting the 
burden on them was unfair. To 
many Venezuelans, the actions 
taken by the state showed how 
corrupt the political and busi-
ness elite had become.  There 
was a common perception that 
the country was rich due to the 
immense oil wealth, but the 
policies recommended by the IMF 
would have put the burden on the 
people, instead of dealing with 
the corrupt leaders, which en-
raged the public. Overspending, 
structural problems, including the 
dependency on oil revenue, and 
the changing market conditions 
caused all of Venezuela’s vulner-
abilities to become apparent—the 
stage was set for a crisis (Romero, 
1997).  
After the fall of the pacted de-
mocracy even the association with 
AD or COPEI cost the candidates 
support (McCoy, 1999).  Venezu-
elans were tired of the way the 
political system had been handled 
during the past few decades; thus, 
they looked to a “political out-
sider” to fix the system.  The void 
created by the disillusionment 
with traditional political parties 
was filled by a strong, charismatic 
leader, Hugo Chávez.  The public 
became enchanted by “personal-
ismo” because of the previously 
centralized, exclusive, and corrupt 
political institutions.  Chávez un-
derstood the drastic changes de-
sired by the people and he knew 
how to earn the trust and support 
of Venezuelans (Cameron, 2001; 
Romero, 1997; Shifter, 2006).  
The aim of Chávez’s Bolivarian 
Revolution was to reject tradi-
tional corrupt institutions and to 
ensure that all of Venezuela would 
enjoy the “fruits” of the oil wealth 
(McCoy et. al, 1999).  The public 
is attracted to his “personalismo” 
and his drive to rid the country of 
corruption, the long-time scape-
goat of Venezuela’s problems 
(Romero, 1997; Rosenberg, 2007), 
and to his persistence to “correct 
the power and wealth imbalances” 
(Shifter, 2006).  Chávez’s Bolivar-
ian Revolution, and his “oil revo-
lution” planned to correct all the 
problems that have characterized 
Venezuela for decades (Rosen-
berg, 2007).  
Gregory Wilpert explains the 
Bolivarian Revolution through five 
characterizations.  First, it was 
redistributive.  The country’s oil 
wealth was spread more evenly 
throughout the country by insti-
tuting social programs and land 
reform.  Formerly, the wealth was 
siphoned off by the political elite 
(Wilpert, 2005).  Chávez also 
directed the funds of the state oil 
company, PDVSA, into a fund over 
which the president would have 
complete control.  He has used 
this money for community based 
“misiones” that provide basic 
services to the poor in formerly 
marginalized communities.  Ac-
cording to Shifter, about $20 
billion was used for “misiones” 
to provide food, and education 
and health services to the poor 
between 2003 and 2006 (Shifter, 
2006).  
Second, Chávez’s project is 
anti-neoliberal, or opposed to free 
trade, state austerity programs, 
privatization, and deregulation.  
Instead, he favors an “endogenous 
development,: education for the 
poor, and political and economic 
integration of Latin America (Wilp-
ert et. al, 2005).  He funds this type 
of development completely by oil 
revenue.  “The money that PDVSA 
does get from selling at market 
prices goes to finance Chávez’s 
revolution at home.  Last year, 
PDVSA’s payments to the state to-
taled more than $35 billion…35% 
of the company’s gross earnings” 
(Rosenberg, 2007).  He provides 
discounted oil to countries in Cen-
tral America and the Caribbean 
and also uses the money to finance 
the socially motivated “misiones” 
(Rosenberg, 2007).  
Third, Chávez’s regime is par-
ticipatory.  The system of democ-
racy is no longer representative, 
but instead based upon citizen 
participation, including local 
public planning councils (Wilpert, 
2005).  Before, the two dominant 
parties, AD and COPEI, controlled 
politics and excluded the public 
from participating in the public 
sphere.  What remains to be seen 
is whether these programs actu-
ally allow the public to participate 
or if they merely act as a façade of 
participation.  Studies still must be 
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conducted to assess how 
involved the Revolution 
allows the public to be.  
Fourth, the Bolivarian 
Revolution is inclusive.  
There are redistribu-
tive programs, like social 
projects and land reforms, 
and affirmative action 
measures.  Moreover “his 
symbolically integrative 
discourse cultivates an 
extraordinary sense of 
belonging” (Lander, 2007, 
p. 28).  As stated before, 
the political system was 
extremely exclusion-
ary under the Punto 
Fijo, pacted democracy.  
Chávez understood the 
need to rectify this situ-
ation and promised to 
ensure inclusion of all 
(Wilpert, 2005).  
Finally, the Revolu-
tion was based upon 
fighting corruption.  
Theories of the oil 
curse and public per-
ceptions have led to 
the belief of corruption 
as one of Venezuela’s 
main problems.  After 
the fiscal troubles of the 
1980s, Romero com-
ments, “Corruption in 
fact became a catch-all 
means of interpret-
ing a wide range of problems, 
especially the economic crisis” 
(Romero et. al, 1997, p. 20).  Cor-
ruption remains a “scapegoat” for 
the country’s difficulties today.  
“Venezuelans have placed their 
faith in individuals rather than in 
institutions.  They want a leader-
ship style that is authoritarian, 
messianic, and nationalistic, one 
that promises to redistribute the 
country and take revenge on those 
who are corrupt” (Romero, 1997, p. 
24).  Because the country was rich 
from oil wealth and a huge gap 
remained between the rich and 
poor, the public was left to believe 
that corruption was preventing 
the oil wealth from being distrib-
uted equitably.  Chávez’s anti-
corruption pledge, thus, 
is attractive to the poor 
and earns him popular 
support among them.
While the Revolu-
tion may seem to be a 
positive alternative to 
the pacted democracy 
of the 1940s and 1970s, 
Chávez’s political project 
has prompted criticism 
by many Western gov-
ernments, especially the 
United States, for being 
anti-democratic, authori-
tarian, and for suppress-
ing civil and political 
liberties.  The view of 
Venezuelan exceptional-
ism is truly deteriorating: 
“Venezuela [is] retreating 
from what seemed like an 
unstoppable process of de-
mocratization” (Friedman, 
2005).  Chávez rejected the 
1961 Constitution which he 
viewed as a major cause of 
Venezuelans’ problems; yet, 
there is no real consensus 
that anything was essential-
ly non-democratic about it.  
On the other hand, it rep-
resented and symbolized 
the corrupt political parties 
that the public distrusted 
(Wilpert, 2005).  Human rights 
organizations and countries 
such as the United States have 
voiced their opposition to Chávez 
for his suppression of opposition.  
He is particularly aggressive in his 
stance on the media as evidenced 
by his closure of RCTV.  He also 
reacted to strikes by PDVSA 
employees by firing thousands of 
them (Rosenberg, 2007).  
Besides his aggressive reac-
tions to opposition, his strategy 
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for improving the situation in Venezuela is viewed as 
unsustainable.  Shifter (2006) views his Revolution as 
“hardly a sustainable model for Venezuela…[It] is fun-
damentally clientelistic, perpetuating dependence on 
state patronage rather than promoting broad-based 
development.”  Chávez is dependent upon a single 
commodity, and oil prices are increasing, but for how 
long can this last?  The market is cyclical, a pattern 
that will undermine stability in the future if oil prices 
drop or if a financial crisis occurs.  Venezuela is still at 
the mercy of the volatile international oil market.  
In contrast to the United States’ discourse of the 
Venezuelan decline in democratic governance, Ven-
ezuelan citizens see their country’s democracy as 
existing and succeeding in Venezuela.  The Latino-
barómetro poll shows that 70% of Venezuelans be-
lieve democracy is preferable to any other type of 
government, although there was a large drop from 
78% in 2005.  However, only 11% believe an authori-
tarian government is preferable to a democratic one 
(The Latinobarómetro Poll, 2006).  The public’s view of 
the current situation in Venezuela is positive.  Venezu-
ela has the highest rate of satisfaction with democracy 
in Latin America, at 57% of the population, up 2% 
from 2006.  On a scale from 1 to 10, 10 being the high-
est, the average Venezuelan gave democracy in the 
country a 7.6. The 2007 Latinobarómetro poll shows 
that 52% of Venezuelan citizens believe that the eco-
nomic situation of the country is positive, the highest 
percentage among all Latin American countries and 
30% higher than the second highest, Brazil.  Not only 
do they believe that their country’s economy is strong; 
they also believe it will become even stronger.  An 
incredible 60% of those polled believe the situation 
will improve (Latinobarómetro, 2007).  
All indicators show support for democracy among 
Venezuelans, as almost the highest in the region ac-
cording to Latinobarómetro, but the country is still 
viewed as anti-democratic.  What can account for 
these differences in perspectives?  First, the view of 
Venezuela as a solid, healthy democracy was skewed 
during the 1940s and 1970s.  The perspective that 
democracy is in sharp decline is not completely valid, 
because it was never truly the exceptional democracy 
it was praised to be.  It was looked to as a “model 
democracy” because of the circumstances of the time.  
The Venezuelan exceptionalism argument was put for-
ward at the time of the Cold War, and the country was 
stable in comparison to other Latin American coun-
tries.  There is no doubt that freedoms have declined 
and that the executive has become more centralized 
and powerful, but the argument that Venezuela was 
a democracy for others to model is wrong.  Instead, 
the illusion of stability and the illusion that Venezuela 
was a healthy democracy have made current devel-
opments surprising, and the exceptionalism thesis is 
finally being questioned (Ellner & Salas, 2007).  One 
must remember that vulnerabilities within the system 
were allowed to exist, and these have finally deterio-
rated democracy in Venezuela and allowed Chávez to 
achieve strong support and popularity, and space for 
achieving his Revolution.
Many Venezuelans seem content with current 
conditions in Venezuela.  A high priority is put on the 
state’s role in the public sphere, especially its respon-
sibility to solve the problems that the country faces.  
This expectation dates back to the beginning of the 
1920s when oil was first discovered.  The role that oil 
played in centralizing power in the executive and in 
underpinning the pact-making and stability of the 
“partyarchy” has produced a strong incentive for the 
state to use its oil wealth to deal with any difficulty it 
faces.  Sixty seven percent of the population believes 
the state can solve all of the country’s problems and 
has the means to do so.  This percentage is the highest 
in Latin America, where the regional average is 37% 
(Latinobarómetro, 2007).  However, the public has 
been enchanted by Chávez’s call for ridding the coun-
try of corruption and for redistributing oil wealth to 
the people.  As shown in the graph above, corruption 
is seen to have decreased between 2003 and 2005.  
These conditions allow Chávez to maintain his sup-
port.  The lack of trust Venezuelans have in institutions 
has led them to look to personalities like Chávez.  
The polls also seem to suggest that Venezuelans feel 
included in the system, which is completely different 
from how they felt during the “partyarchy.”  McCoy 
suggests that the acceptance of Chávez is because 
Venezuelan political leaders failed to include new 
participants in the political system and did not evolve 
with their changing constituents (McCoy, 1999).   
Has the public allowed Chávez the space to rule 
because they welcome the larger role of the state?  
Or, has the public enchantment with Chávez allowed 
them to ignore the oppressiveness of Chávez’s rule?  
Are these social programs even effective and of qual-
101
ity?  There are questions as to whether the Chávez 
presidency allows true participation and inclusion 
when “virtually all key decisions are in the hands 
of the president” (Shifter et. al, 2006).  His oppres-
siveness combined with the lack of sustainability in 
Chávez’s project leads to the question: how long will 
this enchantment last?  The recent defeat of Chávez’s 
plan to extend term limits, to call for a state of emer-
gency for an unlimited amount of time, and to in-
crease the state role in the economy casts the doubt 
on Venezuelans’ clear support for Chávez.  
Conclusion
 Venezuelan exceptionalism was based upon 
the nature of the state and the government’s strategies 
during the period of pacted democracy and “partyar-
chy.”  The centralized authority in the state and pact-
making, along with the use of oil revenue, allowed the 
state to maintain relative stability and perpetuated the 
illusion that the Venezuelan state of democracy was 
healthy and stable among the public and in the United 
States.  Furthermore, the public’s belief in a strong 
state to deal with all the country’s problems remains 
today.  However, this approach to statecraft allowed 
Venezuela to hide vulnerabilities that inevitably de-
veloped into future problems, especially the financial 
crisis of the 1980s.  The lack of fiscal discipline and 
corruption ultimately exposed these ignored prob-
lems.
As a result, Venezuelans distrust state institutions, 
especially the traditional political parties, which are 
viewed as exclusionary and corrupt.  They believe the 
country is rich from its oil wealth, but the masses have 
not benefitted from this wealth because the corrupt 
and malevolent elites stole the country’s money for 
their own benefit, rather than redistributing it to the 
people.  This disillusionment opened up a vacuum of 
power conducive to the emergence of a charismatic 
leader.  The public would look to personalities, like 
Hugo Chávez, who promised to change the status quo. 
The Chávez regime is criticized for its authoritar-
ian, anti-United States, and socialist rhetoric and 
practices; yet, the countrymen seem content with the 
state of democracy in Venezuela, as evidenced by the 
Latinobarómetro polls.  However, this poll contrasts 
with recent events by opposition movements like the 
defeat of Chávez’s proposed charter to end term lim-
its.  Still, the executive is powerful and there is strong 
support for Chávez because of his determined mis-
sion of redistributing oil wealth by instituting social 
programs and by ridding the country of corruption.  
Whether or not the public will continue to trust the 
leader and his Revolution is becoming seriously ques-
tioned, but democracy will continue to decline unless 
the public starts to look to reforming political institu-
tions like the exclusionary parties rather than trusting 
the “personalismo” of individuals like Chávez.  
